Many applications of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) require deploying sensors in hostile environments, where an adversary may eavesdrop communications. To secure communications in WSNs, the q-composite key predistribution scheme has been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we investigate secure k-connectivity in WSNs operating under the q-composite scheme, in consideration of the unreliability of wireless links. Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors can find a path in between for secure communication, even when k − 1 sensors fail. We present conditions on how to set the network parameters such that the network has secure k-connectivity asymptotically almost surely. The result is given in the form of a sharp zero-one law.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSNs) enable a broad range of applications including military surveillance, industrial monitoring, and home automation [1] . When WSNs are deployed in hostile environments, cryptographic mechanisms are needed to secure communications between sensors. Because the network topology is often unknown before deployment, the idea of key predistribution has been proposed to protect sensor communications [2] .
Since Eschenauer and Gligor [2] introduced the basic key predistribution scheme, key predistribution schemes have been widely studied in the literature [3] - [8] . Among many key predistribution schemes, the q-composite scheme proposed by Chan et al. [9] as an extension of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [2] has received considerable interest [10] - [16] (the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme is the q-composite scheme in the special case of q = 1). The q-composite scheme works as follows. For a WSN with n sensors, prior to deployment, each sensor is independently assigned K n different keys which are The author was with Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA, and also with Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281, USA. He is now with Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798.
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Digital Object Identifier: selected uniformly at random from a pool P n of P n distinct keys, where K n is referred to as the key ring size. After deployment, any two sensors establish a secure link in between if and only if they share at least q key(s) and the physical link constraint between them is satisfied. P n and K n are functions of n, with the natural condition 1 ≤ q ≤ K n ≤ P n . Examples of physical link constraints include the reliability of the transmission channel [16] - [19] and the requirement that the distance between two sensors need to be close enough for direct communication [20] - [23] . The q-composite scheme with q ≥ 2 outperforms the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme with q = 1 in terms of the strength against small-scale sensor capture while trading off increased vulnerability in the face of large-scale attacks [9] . In this paper, we investigate secure k-connectivity in WSNs employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme with the physical link constraint represented by the on/off channel model comprising independent channels which are either on or off. Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors can find a path in between for secure communication, even when any k − 1 sensors fail and are deleted from the network topology. The on/off channel model captures the unreliability of wireless links due to physical barriers between sensors or harsh environmental conditions impairing communications [24] - [26] . Our results are given in the form of a sharp zeroone law, meaning that the network is securely k-connected asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) under certain parameter conditions and does not have secure k-connectivity a.a.s. if parameters are slightly changed, where an event happens a.a.s. if its probability converges to 1 over a sequence of sets (i.e., in this paper, as the number of sensors tends to infinity). In the asymptotic sense, the zero-one law specifies the critical scaling of the model parameters in terms of secure k-connectivity. Despite being asymptotic, such a critical scaling provides useful insights to understand secure WSNs. In a secure WSN, to increase the probability of k-connectivity, it is often required to enlarge the number of keys in each sensor's memory. However, since sensors are expected to have limited memory, it is desirable for key distribution schemes to have low memory requirements [2] , [9] , [27] , [28] . Therefore, it is important to establish a zero-one law in order to carefully dimension the q-composite key predistribution scheme for secure communications between sensors.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. After Section II describes the system model, Section III presents the results. We survey related work in Section IV. Sections V and VI are devoted to proving the results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The studied WSN consists of n sensors, employs the qcomposite key predistribution scheme, and works under the on/off channel model. We will explain that the graph representing the studied WSN is an intersection of two distinct types of random graphs. The intertwining of random graphs makes the analysis challenging.
We use a node set V n = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } to represent the n sensors (the terms sensor and node are interchangeable in this paper). For each node v i ∈ V n , let the set of its K n different keys be S i . According to the q-composite key predistribution scheme, S i is uniformly distributed among all K n -size subsets of a key pool P n of P n keys.
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is modeled by a uniform q-intersection graph [8] denoted by G q (n, K n , P n ). In such a graph defined on the node set V n , any two distinct nodes v i and v j have an edge in between if and only if they share at least q key(s) (an event denoted by Γ ij ) . With |A| being the cardinality of a set A, event Γ ij is given by
Under the on/off channel model, each node-to-node channel is independently on with probability p n and off with probability (1 − p n ), where p n is a function of n with 0 < p n ≤ 1. Letting L ij be the event that the channel between distinct nodes v i and v j is on, we have P [L ij ] = p n , where P[E] denotes the probability that an event E happens, throughout the paper. The network topology under the on/off channel model is given by an Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ) [29] with the node set being V n and the edge set specified by L ij .
Finally, we use G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) to model the n-node WSN operating under the q-composite scheme and the on/off channel model. In graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) defined on the node set V n , there exists an edge between nodes v i and v j (an event denoted by E ij ) if and only if events Γ ij and L ij both happen. We have E ij = Γ ij ∩ L ij . Clearly, the edge set of G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) is the intersection of the edge sets of G q (n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ), and these graphs are all defined on the vertex set V n . Then G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) can be seen as the intersection of G q (n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ); i.e., G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) = G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n ).
In Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ), all edges are independent of each other. However, in graph G q (n, K n , P n ), the edges are not independent since the events that different pairs of three nodes share q key(s) are not independent. A recent work [8] demonstrates different behavior of G q (n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ) in terms of clustering coefficient.
Throughout the paper, q and k are arbitrary positive integers and do not scale with n. We define s(K n , P n , q) as the probability that two different nodes share at least q key(s) and t(K n , P n , q, p n ) as the probability that two distinct nodes have a secure link in G q (n, K n , P n , p n ). We often write s(K n , P n , q) and t(K n , P n , q, p n ) as s n and t n respectively for simplicity. Clearly, s n and t n are the edge probabilities in graphs G q (n, K n , P n ) and G q (n, K n , P n , p n ), respectively.
From E ij = L ij ∩ Γ ij and the independence of L ij and Γ ij , we obtain
By definition, s n is determined through
where it holds for P n ≥ 2K n that
which along with (1) and (2) induce that under P n ≥ 2K n ,
III. THE RESULTS
We now present the results. The natural logarithm function is given by ln. We use the standard asymptotic notation o(·), ω(·), O(·), Ω(·), Θ(·), ∼ in [28, Footnote 1]. These symbols and all other limits are understood with n → ∞.
Theorem 1 below presents a sharp zero-one law for kconnectivity in a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ). In the secure sensor network modeled by G q (n, K n , P n , p n ), k-connectivity enables any two sensors to have secure communication either directly or through the help of relaying nodes, even when any k − 1 sensors are removed from the network.
Theorem 1 For a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ), with a sequence α n defined through t n = ln n + (k − 1) ln ln n + α n n ,
where t n denoting the edge probability of G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) is given by (4) , then it holds under P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1) that
Theorem 1 presents a strong zero-one law for kconnectivity in graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ), where a critical scaling of t n can be set as ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+c n with any constant c. In addition, the conditions P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1) in Theorem 1 are reasonable, since it is expected [2] , [4] , [9] , [15] that for security purposes, the key pool size P n is at least on the order of the node number n, and is much larger than the number K n of keys on each sensor. For example, for n between 1000 and 10000, Di Pietro et al. [14] find that a suitable choice is to set P n as n ln n 32 and set K n as ln n.
IV. RELATED WORK
We now compare Theorem 1 in this paper with related results [11] , [16] , [17] , [28] in the literature. After the detailed comparison, we discuss more related work.
Comparison with [11] . Recently, [11, Theorem 1] presents the result on the probability of minimum degree being at least k in G q (n, K n , P n , p n ). An extension to k-connectivity is also given in [11] . Below, we first explain that the results for kconnectivity in this paper are stronger than the k-connectivity results in [11] , and then show that the proof techniques in this paper are more advanced than those in [11] .
To ensure k-connectivity (i.e., the one-law part), we need t n = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n with lim n→∞ α n = ∞. Then the requirement on the key ring size K n (i.e., the number of keys on each sensor) in this paper for k-connectivity is K n = Ω n
according to Lemma 1-Property (ii) below, while the requirement on the key ring size K n in [11] for k-connectivity satisfies K n = ω n 1− 1 q (ln n) 1+ 1 q p n − 1 q according to Lemma 1-Property (iii) below, although the k-connectivity result in [11] mentions K n = Ω(n ǫ ) for a positive constant ǫ (note that
Then we see that the order
of the minimal K n in [11] is more than the square of the order n
2q of the minimal K n in this paper, given
= ln n. Lemma 1 below presents the requirement on the key ring size K n in this paper and [11] for k-connectivity.
Lemma 1 Under P n = ω(1), if the sequence α n defined by (5) satisfies either lim n→∞ α n = ∞ or |α n | = o(ln n), then
(ii) if P n = Ω(n) (a condition of Theorem 1 in this paper), we have K n = Ω n
n ln n (a condition in the discussion of [11] ),
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proving property (i): Given (5) (i.e., t n = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ), we know from either lim n→∞ α n = ∞ or |α n | = o(ln n) that t n = Ω ln n n . Note that when |α n | = o(ln n), we have the stronger result t n = Θ ln n n , but we can still write t n = Ω ln n n . Then t n = Ω ln n n and t n = p n s n of (1) imply s n = Ω ln n np n .
Note that the q-composite scheme enforces the natural condi-
, which further means
where the last step uses P n = ω(1).
We use (7) and (8) to derive Kn 2 Pn = Ω ln n npn 1 q , which implies
Proving property (ii):
We use the condition P n = Ω(n) of property (ii) and
.
Proving property (iii):
We use the condition Kn Pn = o 1 n ln n of property (iii) and the result K n = Ω n − 1 2q (ln n)
, which further implies
. We have explained above that the k-connectivity results in this paper are stronger than the k-connectivity results in [11] . We now discuss the underlying reason: the proof techniques in this paper are better than those in [11] . Specifically, the challenges for k-connectivity analysis in graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) result from the dependencies between the edges as well as the intertwining between different random graphs G q (n, K n , P n ) and G(n, p n ) in the graph intersection G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) = G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n ). The edge dependencies in G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) exist since the events that different pairs of three nodes share q key(s) are not independent. To address the above challenges for kconnectivity analysis, we carefully analyze the graph structure of G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) and present a direct proof. In contrast, [11] provides an indirect proof by building the relationship between G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) and another simpler random graph where the above dependencies between the edges are canceled out. As already discussed above, the k-connectivity results derived from our direct proof are much stronger than those derived from the indirect proof in [11] .
Comparison with [16] , [17] . As detailed in Section II, the graph model G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) = G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n ) studied in this paper represents the topology of a secure sensor network employing the q-composite key predistribution scheme [2] under the on/off channel model. When q = 1, graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) reduces to G 1 (n, K n , P n , p n ), which models the topology of a secure sensor network employing the Eschenauer-Gligor key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model. For graph G 1 (n, K n , P n , p n ), Yagan [16] presents a zero-one law for connectivity, while Zhao et al. [17] extend the result to k-connectivity. Below we compare [16] , [17] and this paper. First, our result is for general q, while the results of [16] , [17] are only for the case of q being 1. Second, our result eliminates Yagan's condition on the existence of lim n→∞ (p n ln n), and eliminates [17] 's condition that either there exists ǫ > 0 such that s(K n , P n , 1)p n n > ǫ holds for all n sufficiently large or lim n→∞ [s(K n , P n , 1)p n n] = 0.
Comparison with [28] . Recently, [28] studies connectivity of secure sensor networks under the q-composite key predistribution scheme, when two sensors sharing q key(s) also need to satisfy constraints of the well-known disk model [15] , [20] , [22] , [23] for direct communication; i.e., two sensors have to be within certain distance to establish a link. In addition to the disk model, [28] also considers the combination of the disk model and the on/off channel model. Although the networks in [28] represent more complex graphs, the results of [28] are just for connectivity (not for k-connectivity), and just about one-laws (not about zero-one laws). In fact, even if zero-laws are added, [28] presents weaker granularity of zero-one laws compared with this paper, as explained below. We now present the zero-one law under the disk model in detail. In secure sensor networks employing the qcomposite scheme under the disk model where n sensors are independently and uniformly deployed in a network field A of unit area, two sensors have a secure link in between if and only if (i) they share at least q keys, and (ii) they have a distance no greater than r n . The former constraint results in a uniform q-intersection graph G q (n, K n , P n ) discussed before, whereas the latter constraint induces a random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A), so the network is modeled by the intersection G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A). If the network field A is a unit torus so that the boundary effect [30] , [31] is ignored, the one-law in [28] and its zero-law extension [31] present the following results: under K n = ω(ln n), K n = o min √ P n , Pn n , r n = o(1) and s(K n , P n , q) · πr n 2 ∼ c ln n n
for a positive constant c, graph G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A) is disconnected a.a.s. if c < 1 and connected a.a.s. if c > 1. Note that although the results in [28] actually use 1 q! Kn 2 Pn q · πr n 2 in (9), we replace it by s(K n , P n , q) · πr n 2 for better comparison given s n ∼ 1 q! Kn 2 Pn q . If the boundary effect of network fields is considered; for example, if the network field A is a unit square with the boundary effect, then the results need to replace c ln n n in (9) 
graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) (i.e., G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n )) is not k-connected a.a.s. if lim n→∞ α n = −∞ and k-connected a.a.s. if lim n→∞ α n = ∞.
As discussed above, the connectivity results under the disk model ignoring the boundary effect use the scaling c ln n n for c < 1 or c > 1, whereas the scaling in this paper is ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n for lim n→∞ α n = −∞ or lim n→∞ α n = ∞ (for k = 1, the scaling in this paper becomes ln n+αn n ).
The scaling ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n in this paper ( ln n+αn n for k = 1) is more fine-grained than the scaling c ln n n in [28] because a deviation of α n = ± Ω(ln n) is required to get the zero-one law in the form of c ln n n for c < 1 or c > 1, whereas in ln n+αn n , it suffices to have an unbounded deviation, e.g., even α n = ± ln ln · · · ln n will do. Put differently, when k = 1, the scaling ln n+αn n in this paper covers the case of c = 1 in c ln n n , and shows that in this case, the graph could be connected or disconnected a.a.s., depending on the limit of α n . Although this paper and [28] use different scalings, we note that graph G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G(n, p n ) and G q (n, K n , P n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A) have similar connectivity properties when they are matched through edge probabilities so that s(K n , P n , q) · p n in (10) is equivalent with s(K n , P n , q) · πr n 2 in (9) (i.e. when p n and πr n 2 are the same).
We now explain that the results for k-connectivity under the on/off channel model in this paper are stronger than those under the disk model in [28] . Specifically, this paper considers
according to Footnote 1 below 1 . In other words, when p n and πr n 2 are the same, the order for minimal K n in [28] is roughly the square of the order for minimal K n in this paper.
In addition to the above differences, similar to [11] , the reference [28] also uses an indirect proof by building the relationship between the studied graph and another simpler random graph where the dependencies between the edges are canceled out. In contrast, this paper's proof is based on an direct analysis of the graph structure.
Connectivity of graph G q (n, K n , P n ). Graph G q (n, K n , P n ) models the topology of a secure sensor network with the q-composite key predistribution under full visibility, which means that any node pair have active channels in between so the only requirement for a secure link is the sharing of at least q keys. For G q (n, K n , P n ), Bloznelis and Łuczak [32] have derived a zero-one law for connectivity, while an extension to k-connectivity has been given by Bloznelis and Rybarczyk [8] , [33] . Other properties of G q (n, K n , P n ) are also considered in the literature [13] . When q = 1, G 1 (n, K n , P n ) models the topology of a secure sensor network with the Eschenauer-Gligor key predistribution scheme under full visibility. For G 1 (n, K n , P n ), its connectivity has been investigated extensively [14] , [15] , [27] , [34] , [35] .
Connectivity of Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ). Erdős and Rényi [29] introduce the random graph model G(n, p n ) defined on a node set with size n such that an edge between any 1 Although the results in [28] mention Kn = ω(ln n), we show that the required condition satisfies Kn = ω n
to ensure connectivity, [28] needs s(Kn, Pn, q) · πrn 2 ∼ c ln n n with c > 1, which with the condition rn = o(1) implies s(Kn, Pn, q) = Ω ln n n·πrn 2 . Then similar to the proof of Lemma 1-Property (i) (we just replace pn therein by πrn 2 ), we derive Kn = Ω n two nodes exists with probability p n independently of all other edges. Graph G(n, p n ) models the topology induced by a sensor network under the on/off channel model (when geometric constraints for transmissions are not considered). From [29] 's result and our Theorem 1, Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p ′ n ) and graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) have similar connectivity properties when they are matched through edge probabilities (i.e. when p ′ n equals t n in the left hand side of (5)).
Connectivity of wireless networks under the disk model or its variants. Many connectivity studies [15] , [20] - [23] of wireless networks use the disk model, where two nodes have to be within certain distance for direct communication. For the node distribution, two common models are as follows: 1) the uniform node distribution, where nodes are uniformly and independently deployed in a network field, and 2) the Poisson node distribution, where nodes are distributed according to a Poisson point process. Results under these two distributions are often shown to be equivalent since they can be connected via Chebyshev's inequality, which bounds the number of nodes in a Poisson point process; see (de)Poissonization in [36, Proof of Theorem 1.2] and [37, Proof of Proposition 6.1]. A wireless network with n nodes is often modeled by a random geometric graph [36] , [37] G RGG (n, r n , A), where n nodes are uniformly and independently distributed in a network field A and two nodes have an edge in between if and only if their distance is at most the transmission range r n . (k-)Connectivity in G RGG (n, r n , A) has been widely investigated in the literature [20] , [36] - [40] , where A may exhibit the boundary effect and letting A be a torus eliminates the boundary effect [30] , [31] . Gupta and Kumar [20] show that with D being a disk of unit area, graph G RGG (n, r n , D) is a.a.s. connected if and only if the sequence α n defined by πr n 2 = ln n+αn n satisfies lim n→∞ α n = ∞. Penrose [36] extend the result to k-connectivity for G RGG (n, r n , T ) on a torus T . Penrose [36] also studies k-connectivity in graph G RGG (n, r n , S) on the square S, while the exact formula of r n to ensure k-connectivity is obtained later by Li et al. [38] as well as by Wan and Yi [39] . To further characterize the kconnectivity behavior, Ta et al. [40] derive the phase transition width of k-connectivity in a d-dimensional random geometric graph for d = 1, 2, 3.
The disk model has been generalized to represent more generic wireless connections. One generalization called the general connection model has received much interest [30] , [41] - [43] . In this model, two nodes separated by a distance [42] , where they prove the probability of connectivity is asymptotically equivalent to the probability of having no isolated node. By analyzing the number of isolated nodes under the general connection model, Mao and Anderson [43] show the differences between the dense network model, the extended network model, and the infinite network model. For a comprehensive discussion of connectivity in wireless networks under the general connection model or other alternatives, we refer interested readers to an excellent book by Mao [44] .
Connectivity of wireless networks under the log-normal connection model. Despite being very useful, the above general connection model and its special case, the disk model, have a major limitation: connections are assumed to be independent in some sense; more specifically, as long as two nodes are within certain distance, they have a link in between (or with some probability in the general connection model), no matter how many other communicating nodes are nearby. The above assumption may not hold in reality due to the interference between connections. Taking into account of this, the following log-normal connection model has been considered [45] , [46] . In this model, two nodes are directly connected if the received power at one node from the other node, whose attenuation obeys the log-normal model, is at least a given threshold [46] . Hekmat and Van Mieghem [45] investigate connectivity under the log-normal connection model, but their results assume that the node isolation events are independent. Without relying on this assumption, Yang et al. [46] provide more rigorous results by showing a necessary condition and a sufficient condition to ensure connectivity, where the bounds in the two parts differ by a constant factor only.
Connectivity of wireless information-theoretic secure networks. In addition to the use of cryptographic techniques, security of wireless networks has also been studied from the information-theoretic perspective, where physical layer techniques are utilized to protect communications [47] , [48] . This thread of research is orthogonal to our work.
Connectivity of wireless networks under the disk model with unreliable links. A wireless network under the disk model on a network area A with unreliable links can be modeled by the intersection of a random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A) and an Erdős-Rényi graph G(n, p n ). Below we discuss studies of this graph intersection in the literature.
For graph G(n, p n ) ∩ G RGG (n, r n , A), Yi et al. [18] investigate the distribution for the number of isolated nodes. Yi et al. [18] , [21] also explore the impact of unreliable nodes to the number of isolated nodes. Gupta and Kumar [20] present connectivity results for random geometric graph G RGG (n, r n , A). In the same work [20] , they also propose the Gupta-Kumar conjecture for connectivity in the intersection of a random geometric graph and an Erdős-Rényi graph. Specifically, the conjecture states that under πr n 2 p n = ln n+αn n , graph G RGG (n, r n , D) ∩ G(n, p n ) on the disk D of unit area is a.a.s. connected if and only if lim n→∞ α n = ∞. One significant attempt to answer the Gupta-Kumar conjecture is the work by Pishro-Nik et al. [23] , where G RGG (n, r n , S) ∩ G(n, p n ) on a unit square S is considered. Yet, they assume that G RGG (n, r n , S) ∩ G(n, p n ) is k-connected whenever its minimum degree is at least k. This assumption is verified by Penrose [37] recently with a lengthy proof. In fact, the results of Penrose [37] also address the Gupta-Kumar conjecture. The difficulty of the conjecture is to analyze the connection structure when two distinct kinds of graphs intersect: even if individual graphs are highly connected, the resulting topology after intersection can still become disconnected. Penrose [37] obtain that the connectivity result of G RGG (n, r n , T ) ∩ G(n, p n ) on a unit torus T resembles the Gupta-Kumar conjecture, but the connectivity result of G RGG (n, r n , S) ∩ G(n, p n ) on a unit square S is more complex. According to Penrose [37] , the underlying reason for different connectivity results under the torus and under the square is the impact of the boundary effect on the asymptotics for the number of isolated nodes.
V. IDEAS FOR PROVING THEOREM 1
In this section, we explain the basic ideas to prove Theorem 1. We first introduce an additional condition |α n | = o(ln n), and then use the relationship between connectivity and the absence of isolated nodes.
We first show that the extra condition |α n | = o(ln n) can be introduced in proving Theorem 1, where |α n | is the absolute value of α n . From (5) in Theorem 1, since α n measures the deviation of the edge probability t n from the critical scaling ln n+(k−1) ln ln n n , we call the extra condition |α n | = o(ln n) as the confined deviation. Then our goal is to show Theorem 1 with the confined deviation =⇒ Theorem 1.
We write t n back as t(K n , P n , q, p n ) and remember that given K n , P n , q and p n , one can determine α n from (4) and (5) . To show (11), we first present Lemma 2 on graph coupling [49] .
Lemma 2 For a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1), with a sequence α n defined by (5) (i.e., t n = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ), the following results hold:
(a) If lim n→∞ α n = −∞, there exists a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n), Kn 2 Pn = o(1) and t( K n , P n , q, p n ) = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+ αn n with lim n→∞ α n = −∞ and α n = −o(ln n), such that there exists a graph coupling under which G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) is a spanning subgraph of G q (n, K n , P n , p n ). (b) If lim n→∞ α n = ∞, there exists a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n), Kn 2 Pn = o(1) and t( K n , P n , q, p n ) = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+ αn n with lim n→∞ α n = ∞ and α n = o(ln n), such that there exists a graph coupling under which G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) is a spanning supergraph of G q (n, K n , P n , p n ).
For any graph that is not k-connected, its spanning subgraph is not k-connected. Also, for any k-connected graph, its spanning supergraph is k-connected. Given the above, Lemma 2 clearly implies (11) . Hence, in proving Theorem 1, we can always assume the confined deviation |α n | = o(ln n). In the rest of the paper, we often write G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) as G q for notation brevity.
Given the conditions of Theorem 1 (i.e., P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1)), and the extra |α n | = o(ln n) introduced in Section V, we utilize Lemma 1 to have K n = Ω n q−1 2q (ln n) 1 2q
= ω(1). Then given K n = ω(1) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1), we use [11, Theorem 1] to obtain lim n→∞ P G q has a minimum node degree at least k.
Since a necessary condition for a graph to be k-connected is that the minimum node degree is at least k, (12a) clearly implies the zero-law (6a) of k-connectivity. Moreover, given (12b), the one-law (6b) of k-connectivity will be proved once we show Lemma 3 below. Note that we can introduce |α n | = o(ln n) from the argument in Section V.
Lemma 3 For a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1), if the sequence α n defined by (5) satisfies lim n→∞ α n = ∞ and |α n | = o(ln n), then lim n→∞ P G q has a minimum node degree at least k, but is not k-connected. = 0.
Lemma 3 is established in Section VI. Due to space limitation, we provide many details in the full version [50] .
VI. ESTABLISHING LEMMA 3
For a graph, let its node connectivity be the minimum number of nodes that need to be removed to disconnect the remaining nodes from each other. Then a graph is k-connected if and only if its node connectivity is at least k. A graph is not k-connected if and only if its node connectivity is less than k. To prove Lemma 3, we have P G q has a minimum node degree at least k, but is not k-connected.
≤ k−1 ℓ=0 P G q 's node connectivity equals ℓ, and G q 's minimum node degree is greater than ℓ .
We define event F n,ℓ as follows:
F n,ℓ : the event that G q 's node connectivity equals ℓ, and G q 's minimum node degree is greater than ℓ.
Then the summation in (14) becomes
The idea [17] in establishing Lemma 3 is to find an upper bound on k−1 ℓ=0 P [F n,ℓ ] and show that this bound goes to zero as n → ∞.
We begin by finding the needed upper bound. Let N denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of the node set {v 1 , . . . , v n } in graph G q . Recalling that S i denotes the set of K n keys on node v i , we introduce an event E n (X n ) in the following manner:
where X n = [X n,1 , X n,2 , . . . , X n,n ] is an n-dimensional integer-valued array. We define r * n by r * n := min
We set
for i = 1, max{⌊(1 + ε)K n ⌋ , ⌊λK n i⌋}, for i = 2, . . . , r * n , ⌊µP n ⌋ , for i = r * n + 1, . . . , n,
for an arbitrary constant 0 < ε < 1 and constants λ and µ specified below. Recalling the condition P n = Ω(n), we let P n ≥ σn for all n sufficiently large, where σ is certain positive constant. We select λ and µ satisfying
Given P [F n,ℓ ] ≤ P [E n (X n )] + P F n,ℓ ∩ E n (X n ) , and (18), we will obtain the result lim n→∞ P [F n,ℓ ] = 0 once establishing the following proposition. After showing lim n→∞ P [F n,ℓ ] = 0, since k does not scale with n, we further derive lim n→∞ ( k−1 ℓ=0 P [F n,ℓ ]) = 0, which along with (14) and (15) completes proving Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 For a graph G q (n, K n , P n , p n ) under P n = Ω(n) and Kn 2 Pn = o(1), if the sequence α n defined by (5) (i.e., t n = ln n+(k−1) ln ln n+αn n ) satisfies lim n→∞ α n = ∞ and |α n | = o(ln n), then for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, we have lim n→∞ P F n,ℓ ∩ E n (X n ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Recall that the node set of graph G q is V n = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }, and F n,ℓ denotes the event that graph G q 's node connectivity equals ℓ, and G q 's minimum node degree is greater than ℓ. Below we analyze the graph structure of G q when event F n,ℓ happens. When graph G q 's node connectivity equals ℓ, we have by definition that there exists a subset U of the node set V n = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } nodes with |U | = ℓ such that G q (V n \ U ) is disconnected, where G q (V n \ U ) denotes the subgraph of G q with the node set restricted to V n \ U . We consider n ≥ ℓ + 3 so G q (V n \ U ) has at least three nodes. Since G q (V n \ U ) is disconnected, G q (V n \ U ) has a set of components (say m components where m ≥ 2) such that the following a and b both happen: a each component is either self-connected or has only one node; b different components are disconnected from each other. Considering that G q (V n \ U ) has m components in total for some m ≥ 2, given |V n \ U | = n − ℓ, we pick one component with at most ⌊ n−ℓ 2 ⌋ nodes, and call this component S. Below we explain that S cannot have only one node. By contradiction, if S has only one node, supposing that this node is v * , then v * does not have neighbors in V n \ U , meaning that v * 's neighbors in G q all belong to the set U . Hence, with |U | = ℓ, v * 's degree in G q is at most ℓ, contradicting with the condition that G q 's minimum degree is greater than ℓ. Summarizing the above analysis, whenever F n,ℓ happens, there exist disjoint subsets U, S of the node set V n = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } with |U | = ℓ and 2 ≤ |S| ≤ ⌊ n−ℓ 2 ⌋ such that ① with G q (S) denoting the subgraph of G q with the node set restricted to S, G q (S) is connected; ② with G q (V n \ U ) denoting the subgraph of G q with the node set restricted to V n \ U , S is isolated in G q (V n \ U ). We further analyze the graph structure of G q when event F n,ℓ happens. We let v # be an arbitrary node in set U (recall |U | = ℓ). Since graph G q 's node connectivity equals ℓ under F n,ℓ , deleting the ℓ − 1 nodes of U \ {v # } in G q will still preserve connectivity of the remaining graph G q ((V n \U ) ∪ {v # }). Since we know from ② above that there is no edge between any node in S and any node in (V n \U )\S, to ensure connectivity of G q ((V n \ U ) ∪ {v # }), we have ③ for any node v # in set U , v # has at least one neighbor in S and at least one neighbor in (V n \ U ) \ S. Now we define C n (S) and D n (S, U ) to represent ① and ② above. In addition, we define B n (S, U ) as the event that any node in set U has at least one neighbor in S; i.e., B n (S, U ) relaxes the requirement in ③ above. Summarizing the above, we know that F n,ℓ is a subevent of |U|=ℓ,
We let N n,ℓ be the collection of the subsets of V n with exactly ℓ elements, and let N r (V n \ U ) be the collection of the subsets of V n \U with exactly r elements. Then from the union bound, we obtain
For each r = 2, 3, . . . , ⌊ n−ℓ 2 ⌋, when S is {v 1 , . . . , v r }, and U is {v r+1 , . . . , v r+ℓ }, we let B n (S, U ), C n (S), D n (S, U ) be B n,r,ℓ , C n,r , D n,r,ℓ . We further define A n,r,ℓ := B n,r,ℓ ∩ C n,r ∩ D n,r,ℓ . Then by exchangeability, we obtain from (19) that
where we use |N n,ℓ | = n ℓ and |N r (V n \ U )| = n−ℓ r . Then the proof of Proposition 1 will be completed once we show lim n→∞ ⌊ n−ℓ 2 ⌋ r=2 n ℓ n − ℓ r P A n,r,ℓ ∩ E n (X n ) = 0, for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
We now analyze A n,r,ℓ := B n,r,ℓ ∩ C n,r ∩ D n,r,ℓ . For each j = r + 1, . . . , n, we define u r,j as the set of nodes, each of which belongs to {v 1 , . . . , v r } and also has an "on" channel with node v j . For j = r + 1, . . . r + ℓ, we define
and for j = r + ℓ + 1, . . . , n, we define D (j) n,r,ℓ := ∩ i∈ur,j Γ ij .
Then we have Conditioning on the random variables {S i , i = 1, . . . , r} and {1[L ij ], i, j = 1, . . . , r} (these two sets determine the event C n,r ), the events {B (j) n,r,ℓ , j = r + 1, . . . , r + ℓ} and {D (j) n,r,ℓ , j = r + ℓ + 1, . . . , n} are all conditionally independent. Then we conclude via A n,r,ℓ := B n,r,ℓ ∩ C n,r ∩ D n,r,ℓ and (24) that
where the expectation is taken over random variables {S i , i = 1, . . . , r} and 1[L ij ], i = 1, . . . , r, j = r + 1, . . . n. .
For j = r + 1, . . . , r + ℓ, from (22), it holds by the union bound that
With u r,j = r i=1 1[L ij ], |u r,j | follows a binomial distribution with r trials and the success probability p n in each trial. Hence, from t n = s n p n , it holds that E [s n |u r,j |] = s n · rp n = rt n .
Given {S i , i = 1, . . . , r} and {1[L ij ], i, j = 1, . . . , r}, the probability of |( i∈ur,j S i ) ∩ S j | ≥ q is given by
. Then on the event E n (X n ) in (16) 
Below we we will prove that on the event E n (X n ), it holds for all n sufficiently large that
for function g r,n defined by g r,n := min e −(1+ ε 2 2 )tn , e −λ2tnr , for r = 2, . . . , r * n , e −λ2tnr + e −µ2Kn , for r = r * n + 1, . . . , n.
In view of (25)- (29) , considering the mutual independence among |u r,j | j=r+1,...,n and 1 C n,r ∩ E n (X n ) , and us-
To establish (29), below we we first prove that on the event E n (X n ), it holds for all n sufficiently large that
for f (|u r,j |) defined by
for |u r,j | = 1, (1 − s n ) max{(1+ε2), λ2|ur,j |} , for |u r,j | = 2, . . . , r * n , e −µ2Kn for |u r,j | = r * n + 1, . . . , n.
We now establish (32) and use (32) to show (29) . We will use the following result given by [8, Lemma 6] :
For |u r,j | = 1, it holds that
For |u r,j | = 2, . . . , r * n , it holds that 
From Lemma 1-Property (ii), we obtain K n = Ω n = ω(1). As proved in the full version [50] , given K n = ω(1), for any constants ε 2 and λ 2 satisfying 0 < ε 2 < (1+ε) q −1 and 0 < λ 2 < λ q < 1 2 q < 1, we have for all n sufficiently large that max ⌊(1+ε)Kn⌋ q Kn q , ⌊λKn|ur,j|⌋ q Kn q ≥ max{(1 + ε 2 ), λ 2 |u r,j |}.
From 0 ≤ s n ≤ 1 and max{(1 + ε 2 ), λ 2 |u r,j |} > 1, we obtain 1 − s n · max{(1 + ε 2 ), λ 2 |u r,j |} ≤ (1 − s n ) max{(1+ε2),λ2|ur,j |} .
Using (37) (38) in (36), we have for |u r,j | = 2, . . . , r * n that 1 − X |u r,j |,n q Kn q Pn q ≤ (1 − s n ) max{(1+ε2),λ2|ur,j |} . (39) For |u r,j | = r * n + 1, . . . , n, it holds that 
As proved by in the full version [50] , for any constant µ 2 satisfying 0 < µ 2 < (q!) −1 µ q , we obtain for all n sufficiently large that ⌊µPn⌋ q Kn q Pn q ≥ µ 2 K n ,
which with (40) further implies 1 − X |u r,j |,n q Kn q Pn q ≤ e −µ2Kn for |u r,j | = r * n + 1, . . . , n.
Summarizing (35) (39) and (42), on the event E n (X n ), we obtain (32) for all n sufficiently large. Now we use (32) to show (29) . From (32) and the binomial distribution of |u r,j |, for r = 2, . . . , r * n , it holds that E 1 − X |u r,j |,n q Kn q Pn q (43)
For r = 2, . . . , r * n , based on (44) and t n = p n s n , we can further show (43) ≤ e −(1+ ε 2 2 )tn .
Given (32) and 0 < λ 2 < 1, we obtain that 1 − ( X |u r,j |,n q )( Kn q ) ( Pn q ) is upper bounded by (1 − s n ) λ2|ur,j | for |u r,j | = 0, . . . , r * n . Then it holds for r = 2, . . . , r * n that (43) ≤ E (1 − s n ) λ2|ur,j | = 1 − p n [1 − (1 − s n ) λ2 ] r .
Then we obtain for r = 2, . . . , r * n that (43) ≤ e −λ2tnr ,
by deriving 1 − p n [1 − (1 − s n ) λ2 ] r ≤ (1 − p n · λ 2 s n ) r ≤ e −λ2pnsnr = e −λ2tnr , where we use (1 − s n ) λ2 ≤ 1 − λ 2 s n due to 0 ≤ s n ≤ 1 and 0 < λ 2 < λ q < 1 2 q < 1, the fact that 1 + x ≤ e x for any real x, and also p n s n = t n . On the range r = r * n + 1, . . . , n, we establish (43) ≤ E (1 − s n ) λ2|ur,j| · 1 [|u r,j | ≤ r * n ] + E e −µ2Kn · 1 [|u r,j | > r * n ] ≤ E (1 − s n ) λ2|ur,j| + e −µ2Kn ≤ e −λ2tnr + e −µ2Kn ,
where the last step uses the result proved in (46) . The result (29) is now proved given (45) (46) and (47) . Then as explained, we obtain (31), where the term P [C n,r ] in (31) is bounded below.
To bound P [C n,r ], we let G q (r) be the subgraph of G q restricted to the vertex set {v 1 , . . . , v r }, and note that C n,r means the event of G q (r) being connected. Let T r denote the collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set {v 1 , . . . , v r }. We can show for any T ∈ T r that the probability of T being a subgraph of G q (r) is t n r−1 , where we recall t n as the edge probability in G q . By Cayley's formula [51] , there are r r−2 spanning trees on r vertices. This and the above result P [T ⊆ G q (r)] = t n r−1 for any T ∈ T r , along with the union bound and P [C n,r ] ≤ 1, together induce P [C n,r ] ≤ min{r r−2 t n r−1 , 1}.
Applying (48) to (31), we obtain P A n,r,ℓ ∩ E n (X n ) ≤ min{r r−2 t n r−1 , 1} × min{(rt n ) ℓ , 1} × g r,n n−r−ℓ .
The rest of the proof is using (49) to prove (21) . Due to space limitation, we provide the details in the full version [50] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a sharp zero-one law for secure k-connectivity in a wireless sensor network under the qcomposite key predistribution scheme with unreliable links. Secure k-connectivity ensures that any two sensors can find a path in between for secure communication even when at most k−1 sensors fail. The network is modeled by composing a uniform q-intersection graph with an Erdős-Rényi graph, where the former characterizes the q-composite key predistribution scheme and the latter captures link unreliability.
